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NO CHANGE IN CLASSIFICATION 20002-8 DECLASSIFIEDCLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ①, 1990  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 2 DEC 1980 REVIEWER: 056567

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 August 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
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 AD/CI [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT : NIE 10-6-54: Anti-Communist Resistance  
 Potential in the Soviet Bloc

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed upon  
 by agency representatives on 5 August.

2. Primary responsibility for contributions has been  
 allocated to agencies as follows:

Part I	- OIR
Part II A	- OIR
Part II B through E	- CIA with the exception of and Part III North Korea and East Germany, allocated to G-2, and the USSR, allocated to OIR.
Part IV and V in Annex	- All agencies.

In addition to the above assignments, all agencies are invited  
 to contribute on any part of the terms of reference.

3. The estimate will cover only Parts I, II, and III  
 of the terms of reference and contributions on these parts are  
 due by 15 October. The supplementary contributions, Parts IV  
 and V in the Annex, are designed to prepare for the eventual  
 post-mortem discussions on the estimate and are due by 1 November.

4. Each contributor is requested to submit his contribu-  
 tion to ONE in ten copies. In addition, copies of contributions  
 should be sent directly by each agency to other participants  
 in accordance with our standard procedure.

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*Contributions should be thoroughly documented  
 by citing some references.*

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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP62-00865R00020002-8

Acting Assistant Director  
 National Estimates

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 August 1954

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 10-6-54: ANTI-COMMUNIST  
RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SOVIET BLOC

THE PROBLEM

To appraise the bases, intensity and distribution of dissidence and resistance in Soviet Bloc countries, and anti-Communist resistance potential under cold war and hot war conditions.

SCOPE

This estimate will cover the USSR, the Satellites, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

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\* With respect to Poland and Communist China, agency contributions should cover only relevant developments (if any) subsequent to those covered in the Resistance Intelligence Committee's studies on those countries (RIR-1 and RIR-2) and contributions thereto.

**QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM**

Contributions are to cover each country separately. \*

**I. BASIC FACTORS AND ELEMENTS OF DISSIDENCE**

- A. What economic, political, and social factors create ill-will toward the regime; e.g., persecution of socio-economic, religious, or ethnic groups, economic controls, economic distress, political controls, ideological divergencies, the regime's attacks on traditional values and practices, encroachments of the USSR and Communist China on national sovereignty, etc.?
- B. In what elements of the population is dissidence and actual or potential resistance found; e.g., in what religious, economic, political, military, ethnic, rural, urban, age, or occupational groups, or other categories?
- C. How intense is dissidence and to what extent does it provide a favorable popular setting for actual resistance activity?
- D. What trends in the basis and intensity of dissidence have been in evidence as a result of new policies adopted after the death of Stalin?

\* Revised 10 August to correct omission in 5 August text.

III. RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE

- A. What has been the history of resistance groups and their activities since the end of World War II?
- B. What organized resistance groups are believed to exist now? In addition to identifying the groups, indicate:
  1. Numerical strength, internal discipline, training and cohesion, facilities, and equipment, etc.
  2. Character and background of leadership.
  3. Political orientation, e.g., nationalist, Titoist, anti-US.
  4. Area of operations.
  5. Trend of strength and activity.
  6. Reasons for dissidence.
  7. Immediate and ultimate objectives under peacetime and wartime conditions.

8. Extent of infiltration into armed forces, bureaucracy, war industry, etc.

9. Type and extent of activity to date, including active (sabotage, intelligence collection, etc.), passive (slowdown, etc.).

C. What is the extent and nature of unorganized resistance (active and passive)? By what elements of the population is it displayed? How is it manifested? What trends appear in its prevalence or type of manifestation?

D. To what extent has organized and unorganized resistance been guided and materially assisted by emigre groups? Other external sources?

E. By what means does the regime seek to inhibit or counter dissidence and resistance organization and activities? How effective are these measures and what is the trend of their effectiveness?

III. RESISTANCE POTENTIAL

A. Assuming continuation of cold war conditions:

1. What types and levels of resistance activity are now within the capability of organized resistance groups? Within the capability of unorganized resistance?
2. To what extent could such activity be expanded or intensified?
3. Upon what factors will increase or decrease of resistance capability depend? e.g.,
  - (a) Improved cooperation among groups.
  - (b) External support by governments or groups, both overt and covert.
  - (c) Indigenous belief in the likelihood of eventual improvement in, or replacement of, the regime.
  - (d) Basic factors of dissidence (as covered in I).
  - (e) State security controls and other factors inhibiting resistance.

B. Under conditions of open warfare, what would be the capabilities for initial action and for sustained action of the following types?

1. Intensification of resistance measures of the types covered under III (A).

2. Independent military action. To what extent would this capability depend on outside support?

3. Assistance to enemy forces, in:

(a) Military or political warfare.

(b) Evasion and escape.

(c) Intelligence collection.

4. How would the capabilities indicated in 1, 2, and 3 above be affected by:

(a) The stage or trend of military action within or outside the country at the time? (e.g., by whether military action was actually in process within the country or area in question, or by whether one side or the other appeared to be gaining.)

- [REDACTED]
- (b) Nationality of attacking forces.
  - (c) Indigenous belief in the likelihood of eventual improvement in, or replacement of, the regime.
  - (d) Circumstances surrounding initiation of hostilities: e.g., which side is held responsible for such initiation?
  - (e) Occupation policies of attacking forces?
  - (f) Aspiration of individual resistance factions for postwar leadership.

ANNEX TO TERMS OF REFERENCE, KIE 10-6-54

IV. SOURCES

A. Bibliography. Identify the significant available studies bearing on resistance in Soviet Bloc countries, and comment briefly on their currency and use of sources.

B. Identify (by categories, not individual sources) the sources of intelligence on resistance in Communist China. For each source category, state:

- (1) Type, amount, currency, and reliability of information secured.
- (2) Current and foreseeable trends in (1).
- (3) Means and channels through which source category is presently exploited, as to:
  - (a) Collection.
  - (b) Dissemination of raw intelligence.
  - (c) Analysis, and dissemination thereof.

V. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

A. In preparing answers to the questions under I, II, and III above, on what important points is information notably deficient in quantity or quality?

- B. On which of these points and how could more adequate intelligence be provided, through:
- (1) Better exploitation of present types of sources?
  - (2) Exploitation of new types of sources?
  - (3) Better processing of collected information?